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A great deal of the contemporary debate about the Aristotelian doctrine of corrective 
justice is concerned with criteria of equality or fairness (to ison) that is embedded in the 
notion.1 Corrective is concerned with the rectification in transactional relationships, both 
voluntary and involuntary, in which one party has committed and the other has suffered 
an injustice. In the Aristotelian account, the law only considers the extent of the damage 
caused; and hence, the parties are treated as equals, regardless what their prior virtues 
and merits have been (Nic. Eth. V.4, 1132a2-5)’. The question that naturally arises is: in 
what relevant sense are the parties equal? This problem, that has been labeled by Ernest 
Weinrib ‘the Problem of Equality’ (Weinrib 2012, 77), has puzzled a generation of 
interpreters, special those concerned with using the Aristotelian notion of corrective 
                                                     
1 Although the more common translation for the type of justice discussed in EN V.4 (diorthotikon dikaion) 
is ‘rectificatory justice’, I choose to adopt the term ‘corrective justice’ as it is the normal usage amongst 
legal theorist and tort lawyers. Except for this term, I will follow Terrance Irwin’s translation Irwin (1999), 
unless stated. For all the other Aristotelian works, I follow the translations included in Barnes (1984)  
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justice as the basis for account of tort law (the area of civil law related with wrongs and 
harms).  
The objective is this article is to examine this vexing controversy. I argue that the framing 
of the debate is ill founded as an interpretation of the Nicomachean Ethics, and, in 
consequence, I propose some basic guidelines for restructuring it and the core elements 
for a new reading. The argument is advanced as follows. In the first section, the 
descriptive part, I set out the controversy stating the central interpretative questions. In 
the second section, the negative part, I reject the three main attempts that have 
advanced in order to solve the controversy. The objective of the third section is to criticize 
the framework of the debate. In the fourth section, I propose an alternative interpretation 
based on the simple idea of transaction. The argument is finished with some final remarks 
in the fifth section.  
 
1 I 
Corrective and distributive justices are the two types of particular justice. Particular 
justice is different to what Aristotle calls general justice. While the latter is the ‘complete 
virtue in relation to another’ (Nic. Eth. V.1, 1129b28, cf. 1130a25), that is, a sort of 
superior-level virtue comprising those aspects of the other ordinary character virtues 
which are related to other people; the former is the ordinary virtue of character opposite 
of being “overreaching”, specially with matters concerning with honour or wealth or 
safety and other goods of fortune. The two kinds of particular justice have different scope 
and are different in nature. Distributive justice regulates the ‘distribution’ of public goods 
and burdens amongst the members of a community. (Nic. Eth. V.2, 1130b30-1, cf. 
1131b28). Corrective justice regulates the rectification or correction of the inequalities 
that arises in transactions (synallagmata) between two individuals when one party has 
committed an injustice and the other party has suffered it (Nic. Eth. V.2 1331a1-2). 
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Aristotle distinguishes between two different types of transactions in which the type of 
corrective justice is applicable. One voluntary, such as sales and hires, and one 
involuntary, which covers additional ways to ‘interact’ with other people, such as stealing 
their property, defaming them, or even murdering them) 2. Some authors, like Weinrib 
and Gorldey, have found in the idea of the voluntary and involuntary transactions the 
doctrines our modern contract law and tort law respectively 
Both forms of justice embody a conception of equality or fairness (to ison), but they 
disagree in the way they understand this conception. Distributive justice allots the public 
goods and burdens according to some pre-established criteria of desert, merit, or worth 
of its members. Although the different communities may have different criteria for the 
division of merit,3 Aristotle claims that this distribution must conform a criteria of 
geometric proportion, in which, ‘the relationships to the part of whole to whole is the 
same as the relationships to each [part] to each [part]’ (Nic. Ethic. V.2., 1131b13-5). In 
other words, equals should be treated equal, and the unequals proportionately 
unequally. Corrective justice, on the other hand, embodies ‘numerical’ or arithmetical 
proportion between the parties of the transaction. The aim of corrective justice is to 
restore the initial equality of both parties before the transactional injustice. An injustice 
arises in a transaction when the action of the offender disturbs the initial equality, 
realizing a gain for her, which is corresponding to a loss in the other party, the victim of 
the injustice. The judge, or ‘the justice ensouled’ (Nic. Eth. V.5 1132a22) 4, remedies the 
inequality by re-establishing the pre-injustice status of the parties, taking from the 
offender the illegitimate gain, and returning it to the victim of the injustice. Aristotle 
                                                     
2 In the following, I ignore the problem whether for Aristotle the criminal law (or better, the form of justice 
that we nowadays call ‘retributive’) belongs to distributive or corrective justice. In other words, I will be 
concerned with the compensation for the harm done, not with the punishment of the wrongdoer.  
3 Aristotle recognizes that different political systems may have different criteria of worth. See, EN V.3, 
1131a25-29, cif. Pol. IV.8, 1293b32-36 and V.2, 1317b3-10 
4 This is Weinrib’s translation of Aristotle’s ‘beautiful formulation’, in (Weinrib 2012, 65). In Irwin’s 
translation, ‘embodiment of the just’, (1999, 73, cf. 231). 
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represents the initial equality between the parties with two equal lines. The offender’s 
injustice disturbs the equality by removing one segment from the victim’s line, and adding 
it hers. The correction restores the equality by taking the segment from the offender’s 
line, and restoring it to the victim. If the equality has been restored, the injustice has been 
corrected or rectified.  
Here, Ernest Weinrib, professor of law and of classics at the University of Toronto, 
identified an interpretative difficulty5. Since Aristotle defines corrective justice in terms 
of the alteration of equality between the two parties of the transaction, the whole 
explanation is dependent on the idea of equality. The guidance we get from Aristotle is 
the following: 
 [In corrective justice] it does not matter if a decent person has taken from a base person, 
or a base person from a decent person, or if a decent or a base has committed adultery. 
Rather, the law looks only at differences in the [inflicted], and treats the people involved 
as equals, if one does injustice while the other suffers it, and one has done the harm, 
while the other has suffered it. And so the judge tries to restore this unjust situation to 
equality (Nic. Eth. V.4, 1132a1-7)  
Weinrib rightly observes that there is one negative and one positive aspect in this 
passage. The negative aspect is that the proportional equality, the sort of equality based 
in merit that applies to distributive justice, is excluded as the type of equality relevant for 
the corrective justice. By ignoring the considerations of moral merit, Weinrib adds quite 
controversially, corrective justice seems to be an issue distinct from the central questions 
in the Nicomachean Ethics ---which is a book about the virtues of character required for 
the proper human functioning. The positive aspect is that Aristotle seems to be suggesting 
that there is a special type of equality, different from proportional equality, which informs 
the corrective justice, in particular, for giving content to the initial equality existing 
between the offender and the victim. We should not, Weinrib concludes, agree with 
                                                     
5 The contemporary development of this problem was displayed (Weinrib 1991, 419-21; although he first 
suggested it in 1983, 40). The most authoritative formulation in (Weinrib 2012, 77-81) I follow his exposition 
for my formulation.  
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Aquinas in the idea that ‘the law treats [the parties] as equals, however much they may 
be unequal (Aquinas 1993, 1:411)’. If that were the case, our account of corrective justice 
will be based on a fiction –or in a ‘noble lie’, as one commentator remarked. In conclusion, 
the crucial interpretative question is: how are we to make sense of the Aristotle’s 
assertion that ‘the law treats people involved as equals’ in Nic. Eth. V 1132a5? This is the 
so-called ‘Problem of Equality’. 
 
2 II 
Professor Weinrib’s answer to the Problem of Equality is shockingly surprising. He simply 
declares that here we find ourselves with ‘troubling lacuna’: ‘Aristotle ... does not tell us 
what the equality is an equality of. The omission is serious, because corrective justice 
remains opaque to the extent that the equality that lies at its heart is unexplained.’ 
(Weinrib 2012, 77). Weinrib thinks that all the criteria of equality offered by Aristotle in 
Nichomachean Ethics are criteria based on merit and personal excellence, so they cannot 
meet the positive aspect of the equality that it was just pointed. Then, he advances the 
enterprise of connecting the Aristotelian theory of corrective justice with Kant’s legal 
philosophy6. As a consequence, the initial equality of corrective justice is the abstract, 
formal equality that exists amongst free purposive beings that is extensively developed 
in the Metaphysics of Morals7. In this theory, each individual is abstracted from all her 
                                                     
6 Weinrib also suggests that Hegelian Philosophy of Right will also do the trick. He is not alone in this 
diagnosis and solution. Peter Benson, less influentially, follows Weinrib in claiming that there is a ‘gap’ in 
the Aristotelian doctrine, but he suggest that it has an ‘implicit’ theory which is strongly compatible with 
the Hegelian Theory of Right, coupled some Thomistic and Rawlsian elements. (Benson 1991, 542-3). 
Richard W. Wright argues that equality that Aristotle needs is the ‘absolute equality or dignity of each 
human being’ and, which with seems to ‘prefigure (through ethical presuppositions rather than formalist 
conceptual implication) Kant's foundational assumption of the "absolute moral worth" of each individual’ 
(Wright 1999, 1890; Wright 1991, 702). A very similar suggestion, with an equal consequence, was 
defended by (Serrano 2005, 149-50, and n. 14). For purposes of simplicity, I will discuss only Weinrib’s 
proposal on the main text.  
7 It is really strange to fill on an allegedly empty system, with other system that is also considered by many 
philosophers as empty as the Kantian –as, for example, Hegel or Schopenhauer remarked (On this point, 
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particular qualities, and they are to be considered as ‘persons’ in the legal sense. Both 
elements together, in Weinrib’s view, are the foundation for a formalistic account of our 
institutions of tort law. In other words, Weinrib finds that the Aristotelian account of of 
corrective justice is ‘inchoately Kantian’(Weinrib 2012, 83).  
The answer advanced by Weinrib shifts the burden of proof to his detractors, who now 
ought to show that there is an account of equality in Aristotle’s corpus that fill that gap. 
There are at least three clear and thorough attempts provide that answer, that I shall 
state and reject, as they, in my view, do not present the argument of the Nicomachean 
Ethics in its best light.  
A first answer suggests that the equality underlying corrective justice is the equality 
derived from the dignity of each individual. Italian Legal Philosopher Georgio Del Vecchio 
provides a good example of this view, when he suggests that the equality behind 
corrective justice is based in the ‘equal dignity of the person’ (Del Vecchio 1953, 53 and 
67-8, n. 13 and 14.)8. Similarly, Pierre Abuquen claims that the solution to the Problem of 
Equality lies in the ‘equal value and dignity’ of each human being, which, in his concept, 
it is based on ‘the logos inscribed in their essence’ (Aubenque 1995, 38). Although this is 
not a doctrine explicit by Aristotle, the supporter may claim, there are some elements in 
the corpus that suggest that he was, in some sense, a proto-Natural rights theorist. For 
instance, in the Politics, Aristotle mentions that man is a political animal, which implies 
                                                     
see (Simmonds 2000, 142, 157 n.21)). There is also a more problematic point. To my knowledge, the idea 
of ‘corrective justice’ is very different in Kant. Due a strong influence of a Hobbesian reading of justice, Kant 
proposed three kinds of justice: protective justice, the justice of living under the law; commutative justice, 
is justice in commercial transactions, and distributive justice, is the actions of the state, including the judges. 
In other words, for what Aristotle is corrective justice for injustice, for Kant is a mixture between ‘protective 
justice’, that protects our rights, and ‘distributive justice’, which is the authoritative declaration that 
resolves the conflict. (On this point, see Byrd y Hruschka 2010, 71-5). For the moment, I will set this 
complications aside.  
8 Del Vecchio identifies Aristotelian distributive justice as the most basic form of justice, should be 
understood as the recognition of the value of the person. This view strikes me as highly implausible (Del 
Vecchio, 1953, 67, n. 13). 
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that he posses logos9, and all men seems to be equal regarding this capacity.  (Pol. I.2, 
1253a3-18, Cf. Aubenque 1995, 38, n. 7). Or it might be argued that it is the man’s 
possession of capacity of deliberation, the element that grants him the status of a free 
individual, and which is fully realized in the political community. (Pol. I.2, 1252a27-23, Nic. 
Eth. VI.5, 1140b4-11), is what grants this equality, as all men with such capacity are to be 
regarded as equal (Kronman 1979, 122-3; Heyman 1991, 861, n. 77). And there are other 
possibilities.  
It is not difficult to see why this first effort is problematic. Even at first glance, it is clear 
that this view does not have an explicit formulation in in Aristotle, and it is fully dependent 
on dubious assumptions based in further remarks, that also require interpretation. 
Furthermore, although it is truth that Aristotle held that there is something special in the 
human nature;10 the view that every human being has equal dignity is not easily 
reconcilable with other doctrines that he explicitly held, and extensively discussed, such 
as his views on slavery or the rights of the women. At least, as Martha C. Nussbaum nicely 
puts the point, there is an ‘internal tension’ in Aristotle between his views that humans 
have equal value and the idea that there are ranks between them (Nussbaum 2001, xx). 
Finally, and more importantly for our current purpose, it is not very clear how an abstract 
notion such ‘equal dignity’ provides content to the equality required. While, for example, 
the Kantian idea of rights brings with a complex theoretical apparatus that explains the 
primary acquisition of property and its transference, and the notion of legal personality; 
the idea of equal dignity simply restates the problem –‘they are equal because the have 
                                                     
9 Logos in this passage has been traditionally understood as ‘language’ or ‘speech’, but it also may be 
understood as ‘reason’ and it will have the same effect.  
10 See, for instance, when he was considering the relationships between masters and slaves, he wrote: 
‘Insofar as he is a slave, then, there is no friendship with him. But there is friendship with him insofar as he 
is a human being. For every human being seems to have some relationships of justice with everyone who 
is capable of community in law and agreement, hence [every human being seems] also [to have] friendship 
[with every human being], to the extent that [every human being] is a human being’ (EN VIII.11, 1161b6-9).   
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dignity’- without establishing the normative consequence of that dignity. Hence, this first 
reading must be rejected.  
 
3 III 
The second reading, in a much more plausible way, suggests that the previous normative 
equality that corrective justice restores is dependent on distributive justice. Alasdair 
MacIntyre expresses aptly this view when he suggest that: 
Corrective justice has the function of restoring, so far as possible, that just order which 
was partially destroyed by some unjust action or actions. Distributive justice consist in 
obedience to that principle of distribution which defines the order protected by 
corrective justice (MacIntyre 1988, 102-3).  
In this reading, as we can see, distributive and corrective justice have distinctive 
functions: the former provides a distribution of goods, the later defend that distribution 
cif. (Hamburger 1951, 45-6; Fletcher 1993, 1688). This first version of the second reading, 
that I shall name simple distributivism, views the initial equality of the parties based only 
in a just distribution. Not all the authors who defend the second reading view it in such a 
crude way, and they propose other an alternative I will call complex distributivism. The 
complex distributivist, while accepting that corrective justice is dependent of distributive 
justice, tries to keep some independent scope for former. Wil Waluchow is a good 
example of this view: 
Corrective justice… is a sense parasitic. It presupposes an independently definable just 
status quo in which each party has, by law, his due -his entitlements- and which owing to 
the actions of the defended has been disturbed. Those action introduce an imbalance 
which must be rectified' (Waluchow 1987, 155). 
Waluchow’s reading presupposes a societal distribution of goods and resources, 
established by law, that is worth preserving. (cf. Nickel 1976, 381-3; Rawls 1971, 9-11). 
Other authors have defended an even more complex distributivism, where the 
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distribution is entrechend in property rights (Gordley 1981, 1780; Perry 1991, 514)11. The 
core idea in the complex distributivist account is that entitlements or property, which are 
regulated by the law, provides the foundation for the prior equality. Then, we have that 
both simple and complex distributivism agree that corrective justice is dependent on 
distributive justice: in the simple version there is less conceptual room for autonomy of 
corrective justice, as correction depends on just distribution; while in the complex version 
there is more room autonomy, as correction depends on the existence of a previous 
distributions in entitlements, which may or may not be just themselves.  
Each form of distributivism deserves a different answer. In the simple form of 
distributivism, corrective justice is merely ancillary of distributive justice. For this reason, 
it is widely accepted that this first form of the second reading does not qualify as a valid 
interpretation of the Aristotelian doctrine. As we have already noticed, He made very 
clear that there are two different forms of justice, which are different in scope and nature 
one from another. To be clear, there is nothing wrong, conceptually speaking, in 
suggesting that corrective justice is dependent on distributive justice, or that the latter is 
a form of localized distributive justice12; but any theory that does not make manifest in 
some sense this distinction is at odds with the text of the Ethics. And there is another 
problem. Since corrective justice is fully dependent on distributive justice, this simple 
interpretation allows that the judge can look at the merits of the parties in rectification. 
If one party, a Robin Hood (as Weinrib calls it), while generating an inequality in a private 
transaction, generates a more just distribution of the burdens, and the correction is fully 
dependent on the fairness of the distribution, there seems to be valid grounds to think 
that the judge should look at the merits and moral worth of the Robin Hood. This is clearly 
                                                     
11It is worthy to notice that this assumption is shared by Benson and Weinrib.  
12 In fact, this is the view famously defended by Ronald Dworkin in political theory in general (Dworkin 1981) 
and in tort (Dworkin 1986, 297-314) 
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contradictory with the Aristotelian doctrine. For these plain reasons, we are lead to 
conclude that this interpretation also fails.  
The complex form of distributivism, though it may escape from some of the former 
criticisms, it is lacking for other reasons. This form deserves a careful consideration to see 
the problem. I have to start by objecting the widely shared underlying assumption that 
relationships of justice only occur when there are prior legal relationships, or worst, to 
property relationships. Notice that in Waluchow’s reading, the crucial element is that the 
law has established societal distribution of goods; without that distribution, corrective 
justice is impossible. This leads to a too limited scope to justice. Since law only exists in a 
particular sort of community (political communities), all the other communities that are 
not regulated by law, but which have several relevant transactions, are excluded from the 
corrective justice. Consider for instance, all the different communities for advantage that 
Aristotle discusses in Nic. Eth. VII.9: those communities, which are made for purposes of 
living together or for purposes of commerce, are in important sense pre-political and pre-
legal (Nic. Eth. 1160a9-16). However, it seems highly unlikely that they develop their end 
and provide the supposed advantage that originates them, without the recourse to 
relationships of justice. There is no need of a political constitution (in the sense developed 
in the Politics) for those communities to have judges as required by corrective justice; 
they might well have the ‘mediators’ that Aristotle mentions in Nic. Eth. V.4 1132a23. For 
what is most important for the current purposes, in this communiy the previous equality 
within them is not a previous distribution of goods realized through law. In those 
communities, in spite there is no law, they still have relationships of corrective justice.  
But there is more. It is really perplexing to me this widely equation between corrective 
justice and property rights. It is truth that most of the relationships regulated by 
corrective justice is related to property; for instance, the major example of a voluntary 
transaction is sale, and of an involuntary transaction is theft. However, not all the 
transactions regulated by corrective justice concerns with property, and some of them 
are not related with property all. Consider, for instance, relationships of corrective justice 
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based on honour, such as the correction for the ‘wrong’ of adultery –whatever explains 
this wrong and justify compensation, private property does not seem to play a relevant 
role here. Furthermore, it does not seem to provide the best interpretation to make the 
previous equilibrium of corrective justice fully dependent on the existence of property 
rights. It is not only that Aristotle’s discussion of property is obscure and dependent on a 
number of controversial particular notions, such as the ‘common use’ of property, that 
allows other people to use my property without having to compensate me; but also is 
that property is regulated by many other virtues, such as friendship and generosity. If the 
former considerations are correct, Gordley’s and Perry’s reading of corrective justice that 
stresses property rights as the foundation for the pre-existing equality cannot be correct.  
 
4 V 
The third and final reading was proposed by Steven Heyman (Heyman 1991), and is, 
without a doubt, the most straightforward response to Weinrib. Heyman suggest that we 
must complete the account of the Nicomachean Ethics with the Politics, where there is 
an account of citizenships. In Pol. III.9 and V.1, Aristotle frames a debate between 
oligarchy and democracy in terms of proportional and arithmetical equality, the same 
notions that he uses to discuss distributive and corrective justice. Base on this discussion, 
he suggest that we must solve the Problem of Equality based on the ‘equality of the free 
status’:  
‘All free men are arithmetically equal with respect that status.  To injure another violates 
his freedom and disturbs the equality between the injurer and the victim, giving rise to 
an unjust gain and loss. The role of corrective justice is thereby restore equality’ (Heyman, 
1991, 860). 
For this reason, he conclude not only that there is no need to recur to Kant to fill the gap, 
because such gap does not exists, but also that the formal and apolitical Kantian notion 
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of personality distorts the personal and political Aristotelian account of society13. In sum, 
equal citizenship is the solution to the problem of equality. I must say, there are many 
virtues in this explanation. In some sense, this reading seems to cohere with the text: 
citizens are treated as equal, and it is not a relevant fact that one citizen is more virtuous 
than the other. Furthermore, the readings seems to agree a lot with the idea that we have 
with the functioning of legal systems in Ancient Times: when a citizen harm a slave he 
does not pay to the slave but to his owner; when a solider attacks on a enemy, he does 
not owe anything them anything because they are not members of the same polis; a 
citizens does not have duties of corrective justice with his family.   
The response is so elegant and well-constructed that it is almost convincing14. But, even 
with elements we have built so far, I can show that it is ultimately unsuccessful. We have 
already seen that not all the transactions which are the concern of corrective justice arises 
within established political communities with a ‘Constitution’ in the sense developed in 
the Politics. In fact, many transactions simply are the result of interactions within pre-
political communities –many of them, whose only aim, is to perform those transactions. 
Being aware of the former notions leads to, in my concept, a more crucial and devastating 
response: transactions that are the concern of corrective justice are not only among 
citizens. To paraphrase from the relevant text: while in Heyman’s account since parties 
are citizens, the parties are equals; in the Aristotelian text, the parties are treated as 
equal, because, in many cases, they may not be equal in many aspects. Furthermore, if 
we take Heyman’s reading seriously, its excludes corrective justice from many other 
situations that are not where the parties are not citizens of a polis, such as, trade between 
                                                     
13 I think Heyman is absolutely right about this. On the same idea, enriches ‘Aristotle’s conception of the 
moral virtues by building into them the Kantian idea of moral autonomy of each person’, John M. Cooper 
argues, ‘one should expect that the tendency to a moralistic, intrusive legislation and moralistic, intrusive 
educational practices that one may justly find in Aristotle’s own ethical-cum-political theory, would be to a 
very considerable extent be removed’. (Cooper 1989, 125) 
14 Some, like Brooks, are really convinced of this reading.  
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members of different polis. To summate my criticism, Heyman’s account fails because 
justice is not only within the polis, and rectification is not only between equals. 
 
5 VI 
The discussion has ended in an impasse. None of the attempted solutions provides an 
adequate answer. Does it mean, like one author have suggested, that we are forced to 
conclude that an examination of ‘Aristotle's corrective justice shows that his legal 
philosophy is incomplete and often paradoxical-asserting premises that are irreconcilable 
on a plain reading of Aristotelian texts’? (Neyers 1998, 311).  My answer is to this question 
negative. Although Aristotle’s theory is far from being perfect, I suspect that the very 
contours debate is ill-founded –in other words, it is not the answer that Aristotle gives, 
but the formulation of the question that Weinrib makes, what we must revise15. 
Whatever are the results with interpretation the contours and validity Problems of 
Equality as philosophical problem, I think that in this essay some elements for the 
interpretation of Nic. Eth. V.4  1132a2-5 have been revealed. We now know that is not 
the equality of human dignity, or the equality of the polis, or the equality of the law what 
determines the initial equality of corrective justice. This equality seems to be derived from 
something more simple and natura: the transaction itself, they parties are equal because 
their the two parts of a transaction. It is in the nature of the transaction in general, and 
                                                     
15 Some reasons to doubt are historical. It is not only the perplexing fact particular debate that Weinrib 
regards as the central question of the interpretation of corrective justice was plainly overlooked for 
centuries of conscious commentators of the Ethics; but also that there are some very particular points, like 
Aquinas’ the translations of diorthic for commutative, where the sense and context of Aristotle’s’ words 
were lost for us – as Christopher B. Grey has very illuminatingly argued (Grey). Some other reasons simply 
refers to the context of the debate, as there seems to be conflicting intentions in trying to provide an 
interpretation of tort law with an exegesis of an author, or with trying to promote important to promote 
own theoretical commitments (like Formalism) using ideas of other authors.. 
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in the definition of the several transactions, where the equality should be found. But 
details will have to wait for another occasion.  
For the moment, we can summate our results as follows: In this paper I have scrutinized 
the Problem of Equality, a pivotal controversy in the interpretation of the doctrine of the 
corrective justice in the Nichomachean Ethics. My diagnosis is very negative: none of the 
current proposals solve satisfactory answer the interpretative question, and further, none 
shows the Aristotelian argument in this best light. We are in need not only from a best 
answer, but from a better framing of the solution.  
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